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Abstract 
Globalization spurs the knowledge diffusion and encourages firms to incorporate investments in innovation in their 
portfolios because knowledge based capital (research & development, intellectual property, organisational capital, skills 
etc.) is a key driver for competitiveness at all levels. This article aims to emphasize the differences in the R&D tax policy 
mix as a proxy for the knowledge based capital and analyse some R&D indicators for a number of 20 EU state members’ 
countries in order to sort and classify those countries in terms of R&D tax policy effectiveness. Moreover this paper 
highlights the need for designing a tax policy that promote innovation and gauge the loopholes of the tax system that 
activate profit shifting strategies. 
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1. Introduction 
The discrepancies in the income of developed countries are in part due to intangible assets besides the stock 
of labour and tangible capital resources (Caselli, 2005), so the future of the economy belongs to KBC based 
economies.  
Corrado et al., (2005) classified the KBC assets as belonging to one of the three categories: computerised 
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information (software, database), innovative property (R&D, copyright and license costs, new financial 
products, new architectural and engineering designs) and economic competencies (brand-building 
advertisement, market research, workers training, management consulting, organizational capital). The key 
advantage of KBC based economies is the lack of constraints as in the case of tangible capital that embedded 
features as rival use and scarcity. 
Taxation is a flexible policy instrument through which governments can influence the entrepreneurial 
decisions related to research, development and innovation. Thus, governments have designed R&D tax policies 
that spur their country’s competitiveness and boost the country’s attractiveness as a location for innovation.  
In this article the focus will be on the R&D tax policy and other R&D related indicators due to R&D 
activities are the most popular area and proxy for KBC and have a higher share in value chains’ creation. 
This paper comprises a literature review regarding the impact of tax policy on R&D spending, a briefly 
examination of the tax treatment of other intellectual assets (patents, human resources, software) besides R&D, 
a cross-country comparison which emphasizes the differences in the R&D policy mix and a cluster analysis of 
the R&D tax policy and other R&D indicators for a number of 20 EU states with the aim of capturing the 
effectiveness of these schemes.  
2. Literature review 
A fiscal instrument to foster R&D activity is represented by R&D tax incentives. R&D tax incentives are 
market-based instruments and could take the form of expenditure-based schemes (R&D tax credits, tax 
allowances and payroll withholding tax credits for R&D wages) or income-based schemes (a preferential tax 
rate for the taxable income derived from KBS). The generosity of R&D tax incentives is in an inverse relation 
to B-index, that rate of pre-tax return required for 1$ of R&D expenditure that depends on the R&D tax 
incentives and the corporate income tax rate. (Warda, 2001)  
R&D tax incentives are positively correlated to private sector R&D spending for those countries that have a 
predictable policy environment and do not engage in reversal policy and the direct government support for 
private R&D is positively correlated to private sector R&D spending from 2000 onwards.  (Westmore, 2013) 
Lokshin and Mohnen (2012) considered that incremental tax credits (the eligibility of R&D expenditures 
that exceed a specific amount) are more effective in terms of R&D spending than the volume-based tax credits. 
Da Rin et al. (2011) concluded that higher corporate tax rates can diminish firm entry rates and thus KBC 
investment. Moreover KBC-based firms are disadvantaged because the corporate tax regimes support debt 
financing through interest payments deductions while these firms rely more on equity financing that is not tax 
deductible. (OECD, 2009a). 
High marginal tax rates can reduce the after tax return of KBC investments but in the case of carry forward 
loses, a high proportion of tax risk is shared with the government and the firm is encouraged to make this kind 
of investments. (Myles, 2009) 
Regarding the R&D tax incentive policy effectiveness it was asserted that only incremental R&D tax 
incentives stimulate R&D (Duguet, 2007). A cost effectiveness analysis of  R&D tax incentive policy  was 
done by Pierre Mohnen, Boris Lokshin (2012) who concluded that the cost effectiveness ratio can fall below 
one for level-based tax incentives because governments support R&D activities that would be made regardless 
of the R&D tax policy.  In such a case the net welfare gain (the social return of R&D is greater than the 
compliance, administration, and opportunity costs of public funding) should be assessed in order to establish if 
the R&D tax incentive policy is efficient. 
The R&D tax incentives may influence the behaviour of firms by decreasing the volume of R&D in the 
favour of increasing the price of R&D by establishing higher wages for R&D personal and thus diminishing the 
effectiveness of R&D tax incentives by 10% (Lokshin and Mohnen, 2008) to 30% (Haegeland and Møen 
(2007). Also, Jaumotte and Pain (2005a) asserted that R&D subsidies were used for raising the wages and not 
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for greater innovation creation. 
Another consequence related to the R&D tax incentives and distorting the firm behaviour is the R&D 
duplication or current non R&D activities labelling as R&D activities (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000). 
There is no study regarding the influence of R&D tax incentives on the welfare, unless the fact that these 
instruments imply compliance and administrative costs and create a preferential tax regime. (Corrado et al., 
2012).  
The location decision for R&D is dependent on a set of factors such as the availability of a skilled 
workforce, engineers and scientists, strong intellectual property rights, higher industry-science linkages besides 
R&D tax incentives.  Only when the factors are equalled weighted between several locations, the R&D tax 
incentive scheme measured by B-index has a higher power in establishing the location of an R&D project. 
Moreover in terms of corporate tax burden effects on the location of intellectual property, Dischinger and 
Riedel (2010) found that a reduced volume of intangible assets is associated with an increase in the tax burden 
in subsidiaries of multinational groups (a decrease in the average tax difference to other affiliates by 1 
percentage point raises the subsidiary’s level of intangible assets by 1.6%). So a higher tax rate not 
compensated by a sufficient tax subsidy can decrease patenting activity. 
3. Tax treatment of patents, corporate workers training and software  
The patent related investments in the form of acquired patents, self-developed patents and licensing of patent 
rights have a different tax treatment. The first two kinds of patents are considered depreciable assets and the 
purchased patents’ depreciation is the cost of acquisition while the self-developed patents’ depreciation is the 
cost of applying and protecting the patent. Tax benefits for patenting take the form of accelerated depreciation. 
For those patents that are purchased some countries offer investment allowances that reduce the cost of 
purchasing the patent. Also if patents are considered as an input to the R&D activities, the expenditure that is 
attached to them could be eligible for R&D tax incentives. Royalties paid for the right to use a licence are 
accounted as a deductible expense and could benefit from a royalty tax incentive such as full or partial 
exemptions from corporate income tax on royalties. In case of patent rights licensing, the licensees are not tax 
purposes favoured unless they purchase and use the patents in R&D activities. 
The corporate training expenses are considered by most countries as current deductions. 
The lack of a standard definition of software for tax purposes impose problems regarding it classification as 
good or service (because it may consists both tangible and intangible elements), types of software (systems 
software and application software) and manner of delivery (in-house developed software, purchased, off-the-
shelf, standard software, embedded in durable equipment -  investment, custom software , leased software ) for 
assessing the tax rules. 
The purchased software is considered a depreciable asset and as a tax treatment it could benefit from an 
accelerated depreciation or low periods of depreciation. For the internally developed software there are no 
specific rules for classifying it as expense or depreciable asset but if it represents an output of the R&D 
activities will benefit from R&D tax incentives. 
4. Methodology of research 
The purpose of this research is twofold:  a cross-country comparison which emphasizes the differences in 
the R&D policy mix and a cluster analysis of the R&D tax policy and other R&D indicators for a number of 20 
EU member states countries with the aim of capturing the effectiveness of these schemes.  
Several indicators were considered to be included in the cluster analysis: the tax subsidy for large firms 
(computed as 1-B-index; it is considered that if the difference between 1 and B-index is positive the result 
represents a tax subsidy while a negative result means tax burden); the business enterprise expenditure on R&D  
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as a percentage of value added in industry, the level of corporate taxation (taking into account the overall 
corporate tax level: corporate profit tax, labour tax and contribution and other taxes), FDI and technology 
transfer propensity and other non-fiscal factors that affect the decision to invest in R&D such as: the level of 
cluster development, the availability of scientists and engineers. The clustering variables were selected with the 
scope to capture adequately the relationships between them. 
The variables considered for this study were controlled for autocorrelation before conducting the cluster 
analysis. The data were taken from OECD database and from the Global Competitiveness Report and refer to 
the year 2012. 
The cluster analysis was conducted in order to sort and classify our collected data into groups and highlight 
the similarities within the same group. We chose a hierarchical approach and as an algorithm, the Ward’s 
method, which minimizes the mean square distance between the centre of a cluster and each member and does 
not have the inconvenient of creating very small clusters. 
5. Results and discussions 
Regarding the type of R&D that the governments want to stimulate, every country has a different mix of 
direct and indirect R&D support. 
The indirect government support through R&D tax incentives take the forms of tax credits, allowances from 
taxable income, tax deferrals (depreciation allowances and current deduction) etc. Among the advantages of the 
R&D tax incentives are industry, firm and regional neutrality in opposition to the direct support such as grants 
which are offered for specific projects. 
Through the R&D tax incentive policy according to the level of the R&D activities the corporate income 
taxes or employer’s social security contributions are diminished, thus the cost of doing R&D.  
There are two types of tax incentives: the volume-based incentives, found in most countries, costlier in 
administration and less prone to fluctuations and incremental-based incentives which are more efficient for 
government but imply complexity in implementation. Incremental tax credits have the benefit of stimulating 
additional R&D. From a policy point of view, a volume-based scheme would be more appropriate if the 
objective is to increase the overall level of R&D in the country, while an incremental-based scheme may be 
considered if the objective is to support firms with high R&D growth. A combination of volume and 
incremental tax incentives (hybrid schemes) may be considered when the objective is to maintain the level of 
R&D and reward high growth of R&D (Criscuolo et al., 2009). As of 2013, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
use a mixed system of volume-based and incremental tax credits.  
Table 1. Overview of available incentives for R&D, patents and training costs for  14 EU countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom ) in 2013 
Type of incentives Countries 
Cash grants Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
United Kingdom 
Financial support Ireland, Slovenia 
Loans Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Slovenia 
Infrastructure/land preferential price Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
Accelerated depreciation on R&D assets France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Romania, United 
Kingdom 
Income tax withholding incentives Belgium, Netherlands 
Patent-related incentives Belgium, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, 
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Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom 
Training costs incentives Czech Republic 
Wages related tax incentives for R&D services incurred abroad France, Ireland, Spain, United Kingdom 
Reduced tax-rates France, Hungary, Netherlands 
Reduced social security contributions Belgium, France, Hungary, Netherlands 
Tax deduction and super deduction ( eligible R&D costs are 
deducted twice: once as operating costs but also as spread 
deduction: as a percentage of the annual depreciation amount) 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, United Kingdom 
Tax credits Belgium, France, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovak Republic, 
Spain, United Kingdom 
Tax exemptions Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain 
Tax holiday Czech Republic, France, Slovak Republic 
VAT reimbursement Belgium 
Carry-forward Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Poland,Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom 
Refundable Belgium, France, Ireland, United Kingdom 
Some countries have introduced fiscal measures to stimulate innovation more broadly by extending the 
eligible base to expenses in advanced technology solutions (such as “green” technology in Belgium) and 
acquisition of intangibles such as patents, licences, know-how and design (e.g. Spain, Poland).  
Tax incentives are more generous for SMEs in France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, so they incur a higher 
tax subsidy. According to carry-over and refundable provisions of the R&D tax treatment the tax subsidy for 
large or SME loss making firm could be lower than in case of firm that does not incur losses. R&D tax 
incentives target-specific are found in Hungary in case of collaboration, in France for new claimants and in 
Belgium, France, Netherlands for young firms and start-ups. France, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, United 
Kingdom impose ceilings on the amounts that can be claimed for R&D projects. There are some countries that 
do not provide any R&D tax incentives: Estonia, Germany and Sweden. 
In terms of the total government support to business R&D as percentage of GDP and GDP per capita for the 
year 2011, France, Slovenia, Belgium have a higher of 0.2% of GDP in terms of the total government support 
to business R&D and a GDP per capital more than 30.000 $ while Luxembourg is the only country with a 
lower total government support to business R&D as percentage of GDP (0.04 % of GDP) and the highest GDP 
per capita (78.080 $). Direct government funding of BERD (as % of GDP) is the highest for Slovenia (0.28) 
and the lowest for Poland, Slovak Republic and Portugal (0.03) while the indirect government support through 
R&D tax incentives (as % of GDP) is the highest for France (0.26) and the lowest for Slovak Republic (0.0002) 
while Germany, Estonia and Sweden do not benefit from any indirect government support through R&D tax 
incentives. 
The overall tax environment is crucial for offering fiscal incentives as they are less effective in countries 
with a low rate of corporate income tax. As can be seen from the figure no.1 there are countries with medium 
(Italy) or high tax subsidy (France) and the highest total tax rate; countries with negative (Germany, Slovak 
Republic, Sweden) or medium tax subsidy (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary) and higher total tax 
rate; countries with negative (Luxembourg), low (Ireland) or medium tax subsidy (Denmark) and the lowest 
total tax rate; countries with negative (Finland, Poland), low (Greece, Slovenia, United Kingdom), medium 
(Netherlands) or the highest tax subsidy (Portugal, Spain) and medium total tax rate. 
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Fig. 1. The total tax rate as percentage of profits and tax subsidy rate for large firm in 2012 
Regarding the second goal of highlighting the features of 20 EU member states countries in terms of R&D 
related indicators a cluster analysis was conducted. After a heuristic approach the number of clusters was 
determined as being 5. The clusters are described by the following features. 
Table 2. Features of the clusters 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (% of 
value added in industry) 
L-M L H H M 
Tax subsidy for large firms M-H N,L,M,H L-M N M-H 
Level of corporate taxation H M V.L-L. L-M V.L.-L 
FDI and technology transfer M M-H M M M 
State of cluster development M-H L-M M H M-H 
Availability of scientists and engineers M M M H M 
Legend: L (low), M(medium), H(high), L-M (low-medium), M-H(medium-high), V.L.( very low) 
 
The cluster no.1 comprises: Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the cluster no.2 consists of Czech Republic, 
Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, the cluster no. 3 is formed from Denmark, Slovenia, the 
cluster no.4 is compounded from Finland, Germany, Sweden and in the cluster no.5 are Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
From the table no.2 it can be observed that for those countries with the lowest level of corporate taxation and 
almost the same level for indicators such as: FDI and technology transfer, state of cluster development and 
availability of scientists and engineers (cluster 3 and cluster 5) the level of business enterprise expenditure on 
R&D as percentage of value added in industry is different but not in a way that was expected. So, the level of 
tax subsidy seems to not have any influence on the level of business enterprise expenditure on R&D as 
percentage of value added in industry in case of very low tax corporate level (a higher business enterprise 
expenditure on R&D as percentage of value added in industry while the tax subsidy is low or medium and a 
medium business enterprise expenditure on R&D as percentage of value added in industry while the tax 
subsidy is medium or high).  
As it is found in the literature, the cluster analysis results show that a higher corporate tax level even if is 
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offset by a high tax subsidy does not lead to a high level business enterprise expenditure on R&D as percentage 
of value added in industry, all other indicators being the same. Is it the case of cluster number 1: Austria, 
Belgium, France and Italy. Moreover those countries (cluster 4: Finland, Germany, Sweden) that are 
characterized by a low or medium tax corporate level and do not benefit from tax subsidy (tax subsidy is 
negative which means tax burden) but point higher than the other countries in terms of state of cluster 
development and availability of scientists and engineers exhibit a high level of business enterprise expenditure 
on R&D as percentage of value added in industry. 
There is also another category of countries (cluster 2: Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic) that irrespective of the level of tax subsidy (either for tax burden) and with a medium level of 
corporate taxation display a low level of business enterprise expenditure on R&D as percentage of value added 
in industry which is correlated also with a medium to high level of FDI and technology transfer. 
An explanation for these results could be related to the lack of R&D tax policy effectiveness and thus an 
increase in the price of R&D by raising wages for R&D personal and not for greater innovation creation, as in 
accordance with the evidence offered by Jaumotte and Pain (2005) and Lokshin and Mohnen (2008). Moreover 
it appears that the R&D funds offered as direct government support for R&D (grants, loans, loan guarantees 
and procurement contracts) are more properly used in additional R&D generation such is the case of Finland, 
Germany and Sweden than the indirect R&D support through tax incentives offered in addition to the direct 
support for some other countries. 
The study limitation is considered to be the limited availability of the R&D tax related indicators, so the 
analysis was conducted only for 20 EU state members and not for the entire EU and only for one year, 2012. 
Moreover, some data were estimated or provisional. 
6. Conclusions 
Governments support business R&D because they see these investments as having consequences on the 
long-run growth of economies and on national competitiveness. 
R&D tax incentives reduce the marginal cost of R&D activities and produce outcomes other than increased 
R&D: decisions to begin investing in R&D for the first time; changes in the productivity of R&D; changes in 
the wages of researchers; and social welfare improvements (taking into consideration all direct and indirect 
economic effects of the policy). However, these outcomes are rarely assessed in policy evaluations. 
For these reasons, the tax policy related to investment in knowledge-based capital (computerised 
information, innovative property and economic competencies) should be designed in a manner that will 
promote innovation based growth. Such a tax policy that stimulates firms to use volume-based tax credits is to 
offer a higher tax reduction in the first years of implementing a R&D project. Another strategy that contributes 
to retaining the human talent is by offering tax credit for R&D wages which lessen the tax wedge. But such a 
provision can be subject to manipulation, higher wages for R&D workers without a higher level of innovation. 
The features of the R&D tax policy should be designed with the aim of mitigating the fiscal costs (tax 
burden can be diminished especially through volume-based incentives and tax credits) and also the negative 
consequences of a tax minimization action. One of the cases is represented by multinational firms that enhance 
their innovation processes by transferring R&D outputs in different locations in order to minimize their tax 
burden and maximize their returns. Other channels for profit shifting are given by the tax treatment of patents, 
especially the growing role of patent donations and tax reductions on royalty payments.  
R&D tax incentives provisions introduced in the tax laws are seen as confusing the tax system because there 
is no list of the eligible R&D expenditures. An effective measure would be the accurate labelling of those 
activities that could be as R&D activities and a clear presentation of those R&D expenditures that could be 
eligible. 
Regarding the preferential regime for R&D, domestic firms involved in R&D activities are in a 
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disadvantaged competitive position in relation to MNEs in the absence of different ceilings and rates for R&D 
policy. Also the young firms face a drawback, as being in the first years of their existence they can incur losses, 
so no taxable income from which they can deduct R&D tax incentives. For these reasons the R&D tax 
incentives should be refundable in cash and the losses should be allowed to be carry forward. 
The R&D tax incentive policies should be assessed regularly in terms of their targets achieving by focusing 
on R&D eligibility, the criteria for firms that qualify for an R&D tax incentive, the treatment of those firms that 
are R&D highly lucrative and also carry forward provisions. 
The fiscal incentive schemes parameters (brackets ceilings or the bracket rate) and also the fiscal incentive 
scheme’s beneficiaries (starting firms, small and medium sized enterprises, a specific industry sector) are 
changing over time thus adding to the existing complexity and predictability.  To counteract this problem, the 
R&D tax policy should be stable (in force for a certain number of years) and should be doubled by 
predictability and high transparency in the policy changes. 
Further studies should take into account the interaction between R&D tax incentives and direct subsidies for 
R&D, also in terms of administrative and compliance costs (R&D tax incentives have smaller costs than 
governmental direct support). 
Because the aim of this research was also to provide some evidence about the effectiveness of R&D tax 
policy and the cluster analysis that was made for R&D tax policy and other R&D indicators for a number of 20 
EU states questioned the effectiveness of R&D tax policy for some countries, further inquiry is needed to 
explore the tax policy effectiveness related to KBC by querying other data related to KBC: the share of 
innovative products in total sales, the propensity to come up with new products, new to the firm or new to the 
market, productivity and profitability, R&D spillovers (the negative ones: market stealing, obsolescence and 
the positive ones: rent or knowledge externalities). 
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